Luka’s Corner

Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France, and Adolf Hitler, Führer of the Third Reich, are widely considered the two greatest military leaders in European history. The two will forever stand together in their military prowess and dreams of domination of Europe. Both leaders attempted to conquer the continent, but both ultimately failed in their conquest. Their common failure was at the hands of the Russians in the years of 1812 and 1941, respectively. While it has been argued that the legendary Russian winter alone caused the failures of both military masterminds, this was ultimately not the case. The fact that Hitler, while planning and executing Operation Barbarossa, was not able to learn from the failure of Napoleon, who executed the French Invasion of 1812, proved that the cause of both of their failures in Russia runs deeper than the severe winter weather. Many factors on both sides, not including the winter, played a part in the eventual Russian victory over the Grand Armée, the French army, and the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces. Due to the insufficient logistics and tactics caused primarily by overconfidence on the part of Napoleon’s Grand Armée and Hitler’s Wehrmacht, as well as extreme Russian nationalism on the defensive, winter proved to play merely a minor role in the failures of two of the greatest military commanders Europe has ever seen.

The source of both Napoleon and Hitler’s eventual defeat at the hands of the Russians was not how successfully the Russians defended, but the critical mistakes in the general strategy used by the invaders. This included the use of an overly large military force that was supposed to use merely its might to subdue the enemy forces. As Robert Wilde, a teacher at the University of Sheffield in Great Britain, explained, the recruitment of such a large military force served as an actual disadvantage to Napoleon rather than an overwhelming advantage. Wilde described the massive army, “…in 1812 Napoleon went to war with Russia, assembling a force of over 400,000 soldiers, accompanied by the same number of followers and support. Such an army was almost impossible to feed or adequately control and the Russians repeatedly retreated, destroying the local resources and separating Bonaparte from his supplies”[2]. The use of a massive army played right into the Russians’ hands, as their use of guerilla warfare and scorched-earth policy was overwhelmingly successful against the superior Grand Armée. The recruitment of the largest military force that Europe had ever seen can be attributed to Napoleon’s sense of overconfidence. He hoped at the start of the campaign to basically march his glorious army into the heart of Russia, overwhelm the outnumbered Russians, and claim a quick, decisive victory. In addition to using such an army, Napoleon showed little of his past cleverness in battle, in which he would engulf the enemy with a swift cavalry strike or surround it with his rear flanks. For example, at the Battle of Borodino on September 7, 1812, Napoleon basically attempted to send as many soldiers as possible into the fray in order to ultimately overwhelm the enemy forces[3]. All other strategy was abandoned in the face of battle.

Like Napoleon before him, Hitler made multiple mistakes during his military’s invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941. The renowned German general’s most fundamental mistake was overextending his army, failing to focus on a single goal for the entire operation. He ordered a three-pronged invasion spread out from Leningrad to Stalingrad. This failure was clarified by Bevin Alexander, a specialist on military strategy at Virginia Commonwealth University, “Hitler’s greatest strategic mistake was his refusal to concentrate on a single, decisive goal. He sought to gain—all at the same time—three widely distant objectives: Leningrad, because it was the birthplace of Russian Communism; Ukraine and the Caucasus beyond, for its abundant foodstuffs, 60 percent of Soviet industry, and the bulk of the Soviet Union’s oil; and Moscow, because it was the capital of the Soviet Union and its nerve center”[4]. As with Napoleon, this failure can also be attributed to overconfidence, since Hitler felt he could spread out his apparently invincible military to overwhelm the Russians on all fronts. He thought that he could quickly crush the opposition and ultimately join all three of his flanks in the center of Moscow to celebrate the resounding victory. Another failure on the part of Hitler while planning Operation Barbarossa was underestimating the Russian resistance he would face. The German troops were told to march light, carrying limited food and ammunition, in order for blitzkrieg to work to its highest potential. In the end, it was because the German soldiers were ordered to bring limited supplies that the scorched-earth policy ordered by Stalin was able to eat away at the German lines. Overconfidence on the part of the invaders played right into the hands of the outnumbered Russian forces.

No greater example of overconfidence was evident during the two separate invasions of Russia than that in the Russian road network. During the French invasion, the roads could not be in a poorer state. The most meager in all of Europe, many were uncompleted and all were very limited in terms of size and width. More importantly for Napoleon and his large invasion force, the roads were built solely for the purpose of trade, not to support the movement of large groups of soldiers. Expecting the road network to be as complete in Russia as it had been in Austria and Prussia, Napoleon suffered a major setback in terms of quickly moving his lines into the heart of Russia. As James T. McGhee, a former officer in the United States’ army who studied European military history, explained, the Russian road system was simply not built for the purpose of “supporting the passage of hundreds of thousands of men, horses, wagons and carriages”[5]. The most important effect the poor roads had on Napoleon’s invasion was it forced the Grand Armée to march into Russia at a very sluggish pace, which allowed Russian guerillas to easily raid the army’s flanks. All in all, Napoleon had misplaced confidence in the Russian roads’ ability to support his remarkable military force.

Similar to Napoleon’s grave miscalculation, Hitler also overestimated the quality of the road network in Russia. In most cases, the roads that Hitler was forced to deal with during World War II were the same exact roads as those that Napoleon had to deal with in the year of 1812. Even during the heavy industrialization periods under Stalin in the Soviet Union, the improvement of the road network was left unfinished[6]. Michael Ruzza, a military historian residing in Washington D.C, described the state of the roads during the German invasion, “…poor roads made it difficult for wheeled vehicles, let alone foot infantry, to keep pace with the dwindling number of tanks in the spearheads”[7]. However, the poorness of the roads themselves would not have proven to be so great an obstacle for the Wehrmacht if there was not such heavy rainfall during the autumn months of 1941. The continual rain quickly turned the dirt roads into pure mud, making it almost impossible for vehicles and infantry alike to move at all. Hitler was so confident in blitzkrieg as a tactic under any circumstance that he failed to adjust when the circumstances for a quick deployment of troops did not provide themselves. Once again, as Napoleon and the Grand Armée did over a century earlier, Hitler and the German armed forces overestimated the condition of the Russian road network, a miscalculation that had brutal consequences.

The miscalculation with the most horrific consequences for the two invading forces was the overextension of supply lines. In Napoleon’s case, this overextension resulted in the eventual lack of food, proper clothing, and other key supplies. The famed general once again expected the Russian campaign to be the same as all of the other successful campaigns he had led in Europe. Napoleon failed to realize that many factors in Russia, such as the roads, terrain, and scorched-earth policy would not enable Napoleon to live off the land as he had in previous campaigns. Robert Burnham, a historian who studied Napoleon’s military victories and failures, explained why living off the land did not bolster the French supply lines, “…for it to work, the terrain must co-operate. There must be a good road network for his army to advance along several axes and an agricultural base capable of supporting the foraging soldiers”[8]. The failure to properly supply his troops with food and water paralleled Napoleon’s first mistake, which was recruiting such a large army. Supply lines became strained and eventually disappeared because the Grand Armée was too large to maintain.

The overextension of supply lines served as a major problem for Hitler in 1941 just like it had for Napoleon in 1812. However, even more so than Napoleon, it was inevitable that German supplies would run out because Hitler employed a three-pronged attack. The renowned German general failed to predict the extent of the damage of limited supplies on a military divided into three parts, a failure even more highlighted as the Russians implemented a scorched-earth policy. As Bevin Alexander described this supply overextension on the Eastern Front, “…the Soviet Union’s resources were immense compared to Germany’s. It had unlimited quantities of oil, minerals, and power. Soviet war production would outstrip German production”[9]. This is important to note because Hitler expected German resources to be superior to that of any enemy during the war. It was Hitler’s fundamental overconfidence in the amount of food, ammunition, and fuel at his disposal that caused the supply lines to become so long and difficult to maintain. It is also important to note the drop in morale as a result of the lack of supplies given to the German soldiers. In the end, before even engaging in an actual battle with the Soviet army, the overextension of supply lines produced horrific results for the Wehrmacht, which was unable to ward off starvation and thirst.

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The Battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775 were the fuse of the American Revolution. They were one of the reasons for the start of the inevitable war for independence, which ended eight years later. The skirmishes at these small towns also convinced the other colonies to help New England and rid themselves of British rule. At the time, New England was the only region that openly opposed the Crown. However, these two "battles" helped unite the divided colonies into one glorious country.

Lexington

The British plan was to search the town of Concord for hidden weapons and ammunition that the colonists were gathering in case of battle. The British did not want a war, so they planned to crush the rebellion in Concord. They didn’t expect a fight at Concord, let alone the small village of Lexington. The Battle of Lexington began at around 6:00 AM, but the colonists were well aware of the British plan long before that. Around midnight, Paul Revere had stepped foot into Lexington and began warning the colonists of the approaching British regulars. All of the militia, or minutemen, who heard Revere, then began to pack their supplies and head for Lexington Green. The sleepy and disgruntled militia waited impatiently on the village green for the British, but they did not come. After two hours, the militia leader, Captain John Parker, told the men to disperse and go back home. Most of them did because they thought that the British wouldn’t come at all. But, the night’s work wasn’t over yet.

The minutemen were awoken again at 4:30 AM by a loud drum. Capt. Parker had been notified by his scout, Thaddeus Bowman, that the British were quickly approaching Lexington. Parker then sounded the town drum and ordered his militia to the green. Seventy-seven minutemen gathered there and prepared to defend their town. At 5:00 AM, the British regulars arrived in Lexington under the command of Colonel Francis Smith and Major John Pitcairn. The redcoats were shocked to see the small group of "rebels" bravely awaiting them. When the British halted at the green, Major Pitcairn rode out into the middle of the field and told the militia, "Disperse, ye rebels, disperse!" Pitcairn did not want to start a battle or a war by attacking the colonists. A few of the militiamen actually started to head home.

This all changed when a single shot was fired. This shot is often called "the shot heard round the world" because it was the start of the war that created America. To this day, nobody knows who actually fired the shot. After hearing it, the British soldiers instantly started firing a hail of bullets at the militia. Caught by surprise, the colonists fired back, but with little accuracy or effect. Major Pitcairn frantically shouted at the regulars to stop firing, but he had lost complete control over his men. Hopelessly, Colonel Smith called for a drummer boy to sound a "cease-fire". When the troops heard the signal, they eventually stopped firing. When the smoke cleared, it revealed that the British soldiers had killed eight of the militia and wounded nine others. The regulars suffered only two casualties. As the minutemen retreated and tended to their wounded, the British continued their long march to Concord. But, they had no idea what awaited them there.

Concord

The militia stationed at Concord also knew of the British plan before the battle started. They were warned by the other colonial rider, Samuel Prescott, because Paul Revere had been captured by the British. Prescott arrived at Concord at 2:30 AM to warn the minutemen of the British regulars marching from nearby Lexington. Rumors of the British plan had been circulating around Concord for over a week and the townspeople had already hidden all of their weapons and ammunition in certain homes and in the fields.

After hearing Prescott’s warning, the people of Concord sounded the town’s drums and bugles. About 250 minutemen from Concord and nearby villages assembled in Concord. They waited in the town for five hours before they were informed by a colonial scout that the British were about to enter the city. Surprisingly, as the British came into view, the militia leader, Colonel James Barrett, moved his men to a ridge just outside of Concord. By this time, over 6,000 militiamen had answered Concord’s call and gathered on the hills above the town.

As time passed, the large militia force began to grow angry and restless as they watched the British soldiers destroy their beloved Concord. At last, Colonel Barrett was convinced by his impatient men that they should defend their town from the British. The colonists started marching down the hills to save the town, when they encountered the British standing in their way behind the Old North Bridge on Concord River. The militia then started marching across the bridge and toward the British troops. The regulars could only watch the "rebels" coming closer because they were ordered not to fire unless they were fired upon first. As the colonists approached, a few of the regulars fired warning shots into the river. This suddenly caused the entire British force to send a volley of bullets into the colonial front line. Taken by surprise, the minutemen fired back at the British soldiers.

After the two sides eventually stopped firing and tended to their wounded, they discovered that two colonial militiamen had been killed. The British had also lost three men and many more were wounded. After this short skirmish, the rest of the regulars were confused by the militia’s brave stand. They did not expect such a large colonial force to be mustered and they realized that they had to retreat. The regulars quickly gathered into two columns, left Concord, and started marching back to Boston.

Afterwards

The militia, however, wouldn’t just forgive the British for destroying their homes. They decided to attack the British while they were marching back to the city. As the regulars navigated through the wilderness of Massachusetts, the militiamen hid behind rocks and trees and shot at the British. They continued sniping at the remaining soldiers for the rest of their journey and they did so with deadly effect. The British soldiers, who had started out with almost 800 men, had suffered nearly 300 casualties before returning to Boston. But, as the British would soon find out, Boston would turn against them as well.